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ABSTRACT
The central focus of this paper is on the relationship between domestic
market structure and export performance. It evaluates the hypothesis that
more concentrated industrial sectors can achieve more easily the transition
from standardized, labor-intensive manufactures to sophisticated, skill-
intensive products, as such industries are better able to cope with the
inevitable reputational externalities involved in producing high-quality
goods for foreign markets. South Korea and Taiwan provide a good test of
the theory, as they have sharply different market structures. The results
of the empirical analysis provide strong support for the hypothesis.
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I. Introduction
For developing countries, probably the predominant question of strategic
trade policy is: how can entry be facilitated into markets for sophisticated
manufactured goods characterized by imperfect competition and well-entrenched
oligopolists? Pessimism regarding the prospects for successful entry into
such markets underlies the widespread unease with outward-oriented trade
strategies. Yet, as the experiences of Japan and the East Asian tigers
folllowing on her heels have amply demonstrated, successful entrants can
always create room for themselves. These countries have diversified into
manufactured products of increasing sophistication, demonstrating that even
the tightest international oligopolies can be shook up.
The broad reasons underlying the export success of the East Asian
countries are now well known. My focus in this paper is on a narrow, but
significant aspect of their performance: the transition from standardized,
labor-intensive manufactures to sophisticated, skill-intensive products where
quality plays an important role. While traditional factor-endowment
considerations typically play the determinant role with the former group of
products, the role of industrial organization comes intb its own with the
latter. Putting it somewhat crudely, the transition can be viewed as a shift
form price to quality as the source of competitiveness. The higher-end
products typically require not only a broader range of skills and
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technological sophistication, but also investment in product quality, customer
loyalty, and reputation.
The rate at which the transition takes place, if it does take place at
all, is naturally influenced by a wide range of factors and country
characteristics. Can industrial policy play a role here as well? As a first
cut, I focus in this paper on broad patterns of industrial organization. We
can identify two relevant models for policy here. In the first, policy would
favor the formation of large firms and conglomerates and direct resources
towards them, discriminating against small firms and potential entrants. In
the second, policy would be neutral and a more fluid, diffuse industrial
structure would result. Which is the more conducive pattern for making the
transition to high-end products? In the next section, I will discuss a simple
theory which suggests that the transition can be achieved more easily when
domestic industry is highly concentrated. The basic argument is that such
industries are better able to cope with the inevitable reputational
externalities involved in producing high-quality goods for foreign markets.
Is there any empirical evidence in support of this proposition?
Fortunately, South Korea and Taiwan provide as close a controlled experiment
for testing the hypothesis as can be hoped for in economics. Starting from a
tiny base, bothcountries have been phenomenally successful in expanding and
diversifying their manufactured exports. Their trade and macroeconomic
policies have been broadly similar, as are their income levels. Yet, the two
countries are radically different in their patterns of industrial
organization. Korean industry is dominated by a handful of large
conglomerates, and firm-concentration ratios are uniformly higit. In Taiwan,
large conglomerates are the exception rather than the rule, and individual
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industries are typically less concentrated than their Korean counterparts.
Given this difference, it would be very surprising indeed if their respective
trade patterns did not reflect it somehow. In light of the considerations
discussed above, this paper looks for evidence of differential performance
with respect to product quality. I find strong support for the hypothesis
that industrial organization and product quality are related in the expected
manner: the quality of Korean manufactured exports--with quality proxied by
unit value--is systematically higher than that of Taiwanese exports.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section sketches out a
simple theory which relates product quality to the number and size
distribution of firms in an exporting industry. Section III compares briefly
the industrial organization patterns in South Korea and Taiwan, and discusses
some of the reasons behind the differences. Analyzing the two, countries'
exports to the U.S., section IV presents evidence on their divergent
performance with respect to product quality. The paper ends with concluding
comments in section V.
II. Product quality and Industrial qryanization: A Theoretical Sketch
New entrants into high-end product categories typically face an entry
barrier altogether different from the usual obstacles. Perceived product
quality is an important component of demand for such products; to be Judged
high-quality by consumers, entrants must invest in reputation or other means
of communicating quality. The problem is even more serious for firms from
developing countries, as they may have to surmount a reputation for shoddy
quality frequently associated with developing-country goods.1
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Such informational barriers to entry have been the subject of a number of
theoretical papers. In the simplest framework, one could imagine that
(foreign) consumers' familiarity with quality increases with cumulated
exposure to the product in question. Provided the actual quality level of
home exports exceeds the perceived level, there may then be a role for export
subsidies to speed up the process of product familiarization (Mayer. 1984).
When domestic firms are differentiated by quality, high-end firms can try to
signal quality by selling at low prices initially (in anticipation of future
profits); subsidies can facilitate such signalling strategies, at an overall
welfare gains to the home economy (Bagwell and Staiger, 1986). But the
problem is that subsidies may also encourage additional domestic firms to
enter at the low-end of the quality spectrum, failing to improve the perceived
quality of home exports, and increasing the cost to high-quality producers of
distinguishing themselves from their low-quality counterparts (Grossman and
Horn, 1987). In all these cases, the transition to higher-quality products is
hampered by informational entry barriers.
These papers do not consider directly the importance of domestic market
structure in determining the average level of product quality in exports. A
recent article by Chiang and Masson (1988), motivated specifically by policy
discussions in Taiwan, focuses on this issue in the context of a simple model
of reputational externalities in product quality. Their basic point is that
concentrated industries will do a better job of internalizing these, and that
they will therefore tend to produce at the higher end of the quality spectrum.
1. On country stereotyping with respect to product quality, see for example
Khanna (1986).
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In what follows, I will base my argument on the same point, and sketch out a
similar model with a few additional twists.
Consider an industry which is a price-taker in world markets and which
exports all of its output. Since my objective is to trace the effects of
industry structure on product quality, I will take as given the overall size
of the industry and the size distribution of firms within it. This is
tantamount to assuming fixed capacities and full capacity utilization. Let
the price received by each firm be a linear function of perceived quality,
p1
— 4. where i indexes firms. Marginal costs of production are linear in
output, but increasing and convex in actual quality. qj For ease of
exposition, I let these costs be quadratic. What is the relationship between
perceived and actual quality? I assume that j will generally lie somewhere
in between the firm's actual quality Cci and the averaEe quality () of home
exports:
(1) 4 — + (l-)q,
where is (for now) taken to be fixed. As a firm's perceived quality level
(and hence price) will be based partly on other exporters' quality choices,
this formulation introduces the externality which drives this section's
results. The average quality level is simply
(2) — Xsjq.
where s is firm j's (fixed) share in industry output.
Letting x denote the firm's (fixed) level of output, profits can be
written as
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(3)
,r
-
which yields the first-order condition for quality:
('i) i $ + (l)s.
Notice that the social optimum would require the reputational externality to
be eliminated by setting equal to in which case the equilibrium level
of would be unity, irrespective of the firm's market share. As can be seen
from (4), this case can be recovered in this framework when #—l, i.e. when
firms can costlessly and perfectly communicate their individual quality levels
to foreign consumers. Notice that denotes the weight attached to own-
quality level in foreigners' perceptions. As long as 4rCl, quality involves a
positive externality, and firms' quality level will lie below unity. In the
worst possible scenario, when firms are branded by the average quality level
of the home industry (—O), will equal the firm's share in the industry.
In general, larger firms will choose higher levels of quality.
We can now investigate the effects of industry structure on average
product quality. Suppose that is identical across firms. In the present
framework, average quality then turns out to be a simple linear function of
the Herfindahl index of concentration. Using (2) and (4) in conjunction with
1, we get
(5) q + (l-*)H,
where H — is the Herfindahl index. As q is increasing in H, more
concentrated industries will operate at higher quality levels than less
concentrated ones. For a given scale of industry output, the Herfindahl index
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is influenced both by the number of firms and the size distribution of firms,
so both factors will come into play in determining q. Notice also that
whether a firm operates below or above the industry-wide average will depend
on the relationship between its market share and H:
(6) - q — 1-[i - H].
Therefore, > q whenever s > H.
As a tiny step towards added realism, consider now the case where firms
can invest in advertising, marketing/distributional channels, brand names, and
the like in order to differentiate their image from other firms' in the home
industry. Let the amount of such investment be denoted by f1. I assume that
investment of this type serves to close the gap between actual and perceived
quality. In the present framework, this amounts to letting be an increasing
function of So we can write — (f1), with *(O)—O, (m)—1, '— 8/8f>O,
and ''— a2/af2cO. Firm profits now become
(7) w — - fj,
with defined as before in (1). Since it may not pay for a firm to invest
in reputation-building, we associate the Lagrange multiplier with fj and
write the Lagrangean expression as
(8) L — [i - f + .Xfi.
The first-order condition for remains unchanged from (4)--except that is
no longer a constant. With respect to
(9) x'(q - q) - 1 + A — 0.
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Notice that for firms that operate at or below average quality (q - q S 0)
this equality requires that A > 0, implying — — 0. For low-end firms, it
simply does not pay to communicate their true quality levels, as this hampers
their free ride on higher-quality firms,
As (9) shows, firms that choose to invest in "reputation" will be those
with sufficiently high quality relative to the average.2 From our earlier
discussion, these will be the firms with larger market shares. For such firms
A — 0, and we have
(9) x'(q - q) — 1.
Since 'b' ' is negative by assumption, high levels of will be associated with
high levels of fj.
To determine the effect on the average level of quality in the industry,
let us divide firms into two groups, one for which f — 0, and the other for
which I > 0. Denote the second set by T (for top-quality firms). Since (0)
— 0, we have
(10) — Xj'r sf + Zje'r [jSj +
where denotes #(fj). This yields
(11) — H + EjET - sj2).
where H is once again the Herfindahl index. If firms were unable to
2. What "sufficiently" means in this context depends on the magnitude of
'(0). The larger is '(0) the smaller is the threshold above q for
investing in reputation.
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distinguish themselves from their competitors would equal H (as (O) — 0).
As (11) shows, the ability to communicate their true quality--as partial and
costly it may be- -raises the average quality level of exports.
The bottom-line of this discussion is that, everything else being the
same, we would expect more concentrated industries to produce and export a
higher quality range of products. When firms have the ability to build
reputation and brand loyalty, the expectation is that the quality differential
between concentrated and unconcentrated industries will be even larger: this
is because the incentive to undertake such investments depends on how skewed
the size distribution of firms (and hence the quality distribution) is in the
first place.
To be sure, the model presented here is no more than a parable. It
focusses on only one possible link between industry structure and product-
quality choice. We should certainly not expect it to provide great
explanatory power regardless of context. But I suspect that for many
developing countries the considerations raised here are likely to be important
ones. Therefore, it would be useful to see if there is evidence which
supports the basic hypothesis. Before I go on to discuss the evidence from
Korean and Taiwanese exports, however, I provide a brief overview of
industrial organization in the two countries.
III. Industrial Or2anizatjpn in South Korea and Taiwan
Probably nothing better illustrates the difference in the industrial
organization of the the two countries than the fact that South Korea has
eleven firms in the Fortune International 500 compared to Taiwan's three.3
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Some of the major Korean conglomerates are now becoming household names in the
industrialized countries (Hyundai, Samsung), while even sophisticated
consumers would be hard pressed to come up with the name of a single Taiwanese
firm. This despite the facts that Korer GNP per capita is a quarter lower
than Taiwans and that the overaLl magnitude of the two countries' exports are
similar.
The differences in the industrial structures of the two countries have
received little attention to date, with few notable exceptions. In his
comparative account of economic development in the two countries, Tibor
Scitovsky (1986) focussed on these differences1 and stressed that the
Taiwanese economy is organized much more along free-market lines than is the
Korean one, with much greater competition among firms in the former country.4
In a series of papers based on case studies of Taiwanese and Korean firms,
Brian Levy has investigated the implications of market structure on strategies
and likely success of these firms in foreign markets (Levy 1987, Levy and Kuo
1987a and b). He finds that firm strategies are predictably influenced by
size, but that small size has not adversely affected the ability of Taiwanese
3. The Korean firms in the top 500, with their ranks in parentheses, are:
Samsung (21), Ltcky-Go1dstar (37), Daewoo (39), Sunkyong (82), Ssangyong
(152), Korea Explosives (182), Hyundai Heavy Industries (187), Hyosung (195)
Pohang Iron & Steel (216), Hyundai Motor Company (261), and Doosan (431). The
three Taiwanese companies are Chinese Petroleum (104), Nan Ya Plastics (467),
and China Steel (489).
4. Scitovsky takes it on faith that more competitive industries will perform
better. But he is forced to conclude: "Ironically [sic), in Korea there is no
evidence that the large profits and fast accumulation of great fortunes that
Korea's economic policies made possible had any unfavorable effects on the
drive, stamina, and efficiency of Korea's businesses." He concludes, in what
would easily give cultural explanations a bad name, by saying "[p]erhaps this
is due to the Chinese cultural background" (1986, p. 151).
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firms to break into high-technology markets, at least when investment
requirements are no too large.
Direct, comparative evidence on industrial organization patterns in the
two countries is hard to come by. Table 1 summarizes the broad size
distribution of enterprises in manufacturing industry. Because the size
distribution is not sufficiently disaggregated, the data here are not
particularly meaningful. They show that large enterprises (300 or more
employees) account for 64 percent of total value added in Korea compared with
59 percent in Taiwan. The share of small enterprises (5-19 employees) is 4
percent in Korea and 8 percent in Taiwan. These numbers do not point to a
great discrepancy between the two economies, but this is highly misleading.
For one thing, the table excludes the smallest firms (with less than five
employees), as statistics are not compiled on such firms in Korea--which in
itself is meaningful. These smallest firms account for almost half the total
number of manufacturing firms in Taiwan. More importantly, the Korean
industrial censuses collect data at the establishment (plant, factory,
workshop. etc.) level rather than the firm or enterprise level (as in Taiwan).
This naturally biases the Korean concentration figures downwards. Moreover,
the preponderance in the Korean economy of the chaebul (conglomerates)
spanning diverse activities across sub-sectors introduces another important
source of downward bias. In 1985, the top five cahebul accounted for 27.0
percent of Korean manufactured exports, and the top thirty 41.3 percent (Lee,
1988, Table 20). There are few such giants in the Taiwanese economy. As a
consequence, the figures in Table 1 greatly underestimate the degree of
concentrition in Korea.
There are other indicators that suggest that the extent of competition in
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Taiwanese industries surpasses that in Korea. Scitovsky (1996, p. 146) draws
the following interesting comparison: between 1966 and 1976 the number of
manufacturing firms in Taiwan increased by 150 percent while the number of
empoyees per firm increased by 29 percent; in Korea, the number of firms
increased only by 10 percent, while average firm size (measured again by
employees) increased by 176 percent. The relative ease of entry into
Taiwanese industries is also corroborated by the high rate of bankruptcy in
that country (Scitovsky, 1986, p. 151). In Korea, by contrast, bankruptcy is
legally not even recognized, and business failure carries great moral stigma
extending beyond the entrepreneur to his family (Michell, 1983. pp. 168-169).
The reasons behind these divergent patterns of industrial organization
are due partly to historical circumstance and partly to policy. Among the
former, possibly the key role in Taiwan was played by the immigration of
overseas Chinese who brought substantial capital with them (30 percent of the
total inflow of foreign capital) and used it to establish new enterprises
(Scitovsky, p. 146). With respect to policy, the Taiwanese government's
attitude has beet much more benign towards small enterprises, and there has
been little overt support for large firms. In Korea, the situation has been
quite different. "Since l961, writes Michell (1983, p. 168), "it has been
the continual mission of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (of Korea] to
prevent what is termed 'reckless overcompetition' ' Given the transactions
cost of dealing with governmental bureaucracies, it is also likely that the
more active role of the Korean government in industry (in credit allocation,
for example) would have served to discriminate against small and medium firms,
even when policy had no such objective (see Levy, 1986). taking some license
with terminology, it can be said that "industrial policy" favored industrial
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consolidation in Korea and was indifferent to firm size in Taiwan.
IV. Evidence on Product quality from US, ImDorts
I now turn to discuss the available evidence on product quality in Korean
and Taiwanese exports. Note first that by most relevant criteria, Taiwan is
the more developed of the two from an economic perspective (see Table 2).
Most important from our perspective, Taiwan is comparatively rich in human
skills and education by virtue of having been an early-starter compared to
Korea. As Table 2 shows, Korea now appears to have caught up with Taiwan in
terms of £iQ additions to the educated workforce, but the latter country is
still endowed with a proportionately larger stock of skilled and educated
workers. On these grounds, then, we would expect Taiwan to be further
along
the transition to high-end products than Korea. The industrial-organization
effects discussed above go in the opposite direction.
To check for systematic differences in product-quality, I examine the
unit values for the two countries' exports to the United States, disaggregated
at an appropriate level. A critical maintained hypothesis is that unit values
are a good proxy for quality. For manufactured exports of the type that will
be the focus of the analysis, this seems to be a sensible working hypothesis.5
The analysis is restricted to the U.S. market in order to obtain
closely-
comparable trade data for the two countries. The U.S. is by far the largest
export market for both countries, accounting for roughly a half of total
5. I have also computed unit values for Japanese exports to the U.S. These
are almost without exception higher than those for the two countries. This is
consistent with what we know regarding Japan's successful transition to
products at the very high end of the quality spectrum.
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sales. It is unlikely that substantial biases are introduced by restricting
attention to the U.S.
Selecting the level of disaggregation at which the comparison of unit
values is carried out requires care. At too aggregate a level, there is
always the danger of comparing apples with oranges. At a too flaggregated
level, on the other hand, the quality range of the product in question may be
needlessly compressed, leaving out useful information about the upper and
lower end of the range.6 I have chosen an intermediate level of
disaggregation, using the four-digit Schedule A classification for U.S. import
statistics (FT 150) . These import data are recorded on a "customs value"
basis, defined as "the price actually paid or payable for merchandise when
sold for exportation in the United States, excluding U.S. import duties,
freight, insurance and other charges incurred in bringing the merchandise to
the United States. In order to focus on products which are important
exports for the two countries, I restrict the analysis to categories in which
at least one of the countries had exports to the U.S. exceeding $100 million.
In 1986, there were forty-nine such product groups. Exports included in these
groups amount to $9.6 billion for Korea and $14.5 billion for Taiwan. a
substantial part of each country's total exports to the U.S.
Table 3 lists the respective unit values for each of these forty-nine
6. For example, the highly detailed seven-digit TSUSA classification contains
categories such as: "moccasins, soled, leather, for women, not over $2.50
pair" (emphasis added).
7. The description further adds, helpfully: "In the case of transactions
between related parties, the relationship between buyer and seller should not
influence the Customs value."
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categories for the two countries. The product groups are ranked in ascending
order of (proportional) difference between Korean and Taiwanese unit values.
A quick glance at the table reveals clearly that Korean exports tend to have
higher unit values than Taiwanese exports. Thirty of the forty-nine products
exhibit higher unit values in Korean exports. Moreover, all of the larger
discrepancies in unit values are in favor of Korea. The unweighted average
differential between Korean and Taiwanese unit values is 27 percent. On the
basis of weighted averages, Korean exports command a price premium of 19
percent (Korean export weights) to 22 percent (Taiwanese export weights) over
Taiwanese exports.
Is the observed discrepancy in unit values statistically significant? An
appropriate statistical test here is the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, which
takes into account both the frequency with which Korean unit values exceed
Taiwanese ones id the relative magnitudes of the discrepancies.8 Using this
test, the null hypothesis that Taiwanese unit values are at least as high as
Korean unit values is decisively rejected at the 5 percent confidence level,
with a z-value of 2,75. Notice that this is a particularly stringent test of
our hypothesis, as a priori we would expect Taiwanese products to be of higher
quality than Korean ones on all grounds but industrial organization.
A related implication of the model is that Korean exporters would be more
likely to specialize at the high-end of the quality spectrum across broad
product categories, as they possess a comparative advantage there relative to
Taiwan. Figure 1 shows that this is indeed the case. Ranking product groups
by Japanese unit values to establish a rough quality hierarchy, we find that
8. See DeGroot (1975), pp. 483-486.
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the distribution of Korean exports is relatively skewed towards the top end.
Twenty-nine percent of Korea's (included) exports are inthe "top" quality
range (unit values greater than $10,000), compared to twenty-one percent for
Taiwan. Korea has fifty percent of its exports at the low end (unit values
$5,000 or lower) and Taiwan sixty percent.
A further test of a different nature would be to see whether the
differences in unit values are proportionately more pronounced in products for
which quality p.ays an important role. Remember that, in terms of our model,
industrial-organization becomes important only when quality is a predominant
characteristic of the product group in question. Unfortunately, there is no
clearcut way of determining the products for which this is likely to be true.
A short-cut is to assume that higher unit values are associated with
"quality-
intensive" products. Using Japanese unit values to rank industries by this
criterion, the following regression results are obtained:
PREM —
-1.03 + 0.15 ln(JAP)
(0.06) R2 — 0.11 N — 49
where PREtI is the Korean unit-value premium over Taiwan (in percent) and JAP
is the Japanese unit value for the corresponding product group. The standard
error of the slope coefficient is in parentheses. This suggests that the
Korean quality advantage over Taiwan increases as we move up from low-end to
high-end products. A doubling of the average level of product quality-
-as
measured by unit values of Japanese exports- -is associated with an increase in
the Korean price premium over Taiwan of 15 percent. This finding is
consistent with the discussion in section II.
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To sum up. these data reveal an interesting divergence in the export
performance of the two countries.9 It is of course entirely possible that
these findings reflect some other unidentified statistical quirks. For
example. Taiwanese exporters could be prone to under-invoicing. Or, the
relatively greater downstream integration of the Korean exporters in the U.S.
market nay lead to high transfer prices being set on these exports, Drovided
that it is viewed preferable to hold income in South Korea rather than in the
U.S. In any case, the hypothesis that quality differentials in the exports of
the two countries are systematically related to their industrial organization
patterns would appear to be worth closer look.
V. Conc1udin Remarks
This paper has combined a simple- -perhaps simplistic- - theory with a
simple test. The findings are two-fold: (1) Korean exports tend to be
systematically of higher quality relative to Taiwanese exports, at least when
quality is proxied by unit value; and (ii) this is consistent with a model of
quality choice in which reputational externalities are less damaging in
heavily concentrated industries.
A crucial final point concerns the normative aspect of the analysis.
Nothing that has been said here should be construed as advocacy of an
industrial policy that actively pursues concentration. Before we can go from
the positive analysis to policy prescription, we will need a more complete
9. Based on a quick look at 1975, it would appear that earlier years show the
same pattern as that of 1986. Among included categories, the Korean premium
In that year ranges from 20.1 percent (Taiwanese export weights) to 30.9
percent (Korean export weights).
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welfare analysis and a more complete model in which to carry it out. There
are at least two sets of reasons, besides policymatcers' obvious concern about
quality upgrading, to suspect that the findings here have normative
significance. First, higher-quality products may carry price premia exceeding
the additional cost of producing them, as excess profits serve as the carrot
needed to sustain quality levels (Shapiro, 1983). Public policies in pursuit
of such excess profits can potentially improve welfare. Secondly, there may
be significant skills generated as countries move up the quality spectrum, and
these may in turn create substantial positive externalities for the rest of
the economy. Once again, policy may have a role to play. If domestic
industrial structure and export performance are indeed linked, as the
preliminary results presented here would indicate, these would be fruitful
areas for further research.
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Table 1: Distribution of Value Added in Manufacturing Industry, by Size
of Enterprise or Establishmenta (percent)
Number of employees S. Korea (1984) Taiwan (1981)
S - 19 4.3 7.8
20 - 299 32.0 33.2
300+ 63.7 58.9
Sources: Biggs and Larch (1988) and Economic Planning Board, Republic of Korea
(1986).
a Excludes enterprises/establishments with less than S employees.
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Table 2: Basic Indicators of Development
S. Korea Taiwan
CDP per capita, 1983 ($) 2010 2,670
Electric power consumption per capita (KWH) 915 2.131
Life expectancy at birth (yeaxs) 65 72
Infant mortality per 1000 live births 37 25
Daily calorie intake per capita 2,785 2,805
Daily protein intake per capita (grams) 70 78
Households with running water (%) 55 67
Households with TV sets (%) 79 100
School enrollment rates (% of age group):
primary Ill 100
secondary 76 80
college and universities 12 10
Sources: IJNIDO (1986). Table 1; Scitovsky (1986), Tables 2 and 4.
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Table 3: Unit Values in Korean and Taiwanese Exports to the U.s., 1986
UNIT VALUES ($/000lbs)
S.KOREA TAIWAN PERCENT 01FF.
CODE DESCRIPTION
753.0 Automatic data processing machines 6347 6214 2.1%
891.0 Articles of rubber or plastics nspi 940 913 3.0%
658.9 TapestrIes & made-up 3080 3212 -4.1%
181.0 Passanger motor veh 2410 2529 —4.1%
898.3 Sound etc recordings & blank medIa 3430 3603 -4.8%
846.8 U garments, Inc shirts of tex nspf KT 4533 4763 -4.8%
845.5 Sweaters & o wear app textile Itt 5581 6029 -7.3%
776.4 Integrated circuits 88333 82203 7.5%
164.8 Audio & video tape players & records 7038 6514 8.0%
164.9 Parts nspf of telecom & sound rep; equ 6426 5932 8.3%
618.6 Pipes, tubes & blanks, Iron or steel 194 177 9.6%
674.0 Plates I sheet, Iron or steel 113 192 -9.9%
699.1 Locks, safes, etc of base metals 1204 1362 -11.6%
635.9 ArtIcles aig of wood, nspf 1201 1365 -12.0%
749.2 Taps, cocks, valves & parts 1235 1443 -14.41
762.0 Radio receivers (ANIFM) & comb 4309 3759 14.6%
844.1 ShIrts, cot, vool, ut, NT knit mU 4860 5752 —15.5%
761.0 Television receivers & combinatIons 2983 3580 —16.71
699.8 Arts nspf of cast iron, nspi 1006 842 19.5%
764.4 Elect telp & telegraph eq & pts 7756 6486 19.6%
851.0 Footwear, new, cxc .iltary or orthopedic 3724 3113 19.6%
785.2 Adult cycles 1151 1463 -21.3%
694.0 Nails, screws Ii other fasteners of base s 325 425 —23.5%
588.8 Profile shapes, rubber I. plasttc 703 567 24.0%
759.9 Parts of ADP I calculating off mach 2009 2703 -25.71
188.0 Parts nspf of motor veh & handling equip 819 1113 -26.4%
819.2 Jewelry etc, costae I semi-precIous 7530 5911 27.4%
163.8 Microphones, speakers & audio asp 2291 1758 30.7%
634.1 Plywood, md wood veneer panels 220 326 -32.5%
642.3 Slacks etc, cot, wool, mat 6158 4511 36.3%
771.2 Non rot elect power wquip 6840 4999 36.8%
775.8 Electro-thermlc appliances nspf I pts 1759 2803 -37.2%
812.4 Lighting fixtures & fittings 812 1373 -40.9%
713.1 Insulated electric conductors (cables) 1312 2263 —42.0%
821.8 FurnIture & parts thereof nspf 1208 795 51.9%
894.2 Toys, gases I christmas oriia.ents, etc 2705 1780 52.0%
697.4 Household & sanitary ware of iron or stew 1247 807 54.5%
848.1 Gloves, bIts & ot wear app lea, nspf 9914 6140 62.4%
843.7 Gara for rainwr; ot wear nspf 10331 6347 62.8%
831.0 Luggage, handbags 2926 1763 66.0%
635.4 Wood mfrs, domestic 1 dec use 1946 1157 68.2%
884.2 Eyeglasses; eyeglass farmes.& parts 10823 6250 13.2%
175.7 Elect-mech household appliances nspf & pt 2252 1296 73.8%
695.3 Hand tools, nspf of base metal 1807 1031 75.3%
894.7 Sporting goods etc nspf 2248 1228 82.9%
736.1 Netal-ctting machine tools 2338 1160 101.6%
881.1 Still cameras & parts; flash apparat 21438 12308 122.9%
118.8 Ferrltes nspt; elect each & eq nspf 10372 3745 177.0%
848.3 Fur clothing & ot art cx headvear 38801 10474 270.5%
UNWEIGHTED AVERAGE 6431 4826 26.7%
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Annex: Unit Values and Exports of Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, 1986
1986 041* unit values ($/'OOO thin total exports (I itlltonsn
Category Description KO8EA TAIUAN JAPAN KOREA 14111414 1*2414
588.8 Profile shapes, rubber & plastic 703 567 1349 28.8 100.6 165.5
634.7 Plywood, md wood veneer panels 220 326 422 6.4 122.4 25.6
635.4 Uood ifrs, domestic & dec use 1948 1157 2511 2.2 164.5 5.9
635.9 Articles mfg of wood, nspf 1201 1365 1616 5.6 102.4 4.9
658.9 tapestries It aade-up 3080 3212 6226 80.5 158.0 14.9
674.0 Plates Ii sheet, Iron or steel 173 192 233 250.95 23.35 2096.7
678.6 Pipes, tubes & blanks, Iron or stee 194 117 280 169.7 52.97 391.1
694.0 Nails, screws & other fasteners of 325 425 748 111.3 207.2 384.4
695.3 Hand tools, nspf of base metal 1601 1031 2262 17.4 193 113.1
697.4 Household & sanitary ware of Iron o 1247 807 1803 68.1 111.1 42.6
699.1 Locks, safes, etc of base metals 1204 1362 2364 18.97 175.9 127.1
699.6 Arts nspl of cast iron, nspf of cas 1006 842 1266 50.5 122.1 102.3
736.1 iletal-ctting machine tools 2338 1160 4161 10.8 106.9 745.6
749.2 Taps, cocks, valves & parts 1235 1443 3493 28.5 100.8 235.4
753.0 Autosatic data Proc each & auzilary 6347 6214 10223 362.9 713.96 2781.1
759.9 Parts of AOP & calculating off mach 2009 2703 2461 94.1 399.97 1951.2
761.0 TelevisIon receivers It co.blnations 2903 3580 6335 442.3 445.2 869
762.0 Radio receivers (AM/PH) 1 cosb 4309 3759 1234.4 214 263.7 1785.4
763.0 Audio & video tape players & record 7038 6514 12009 352.2 187.6 5364.8
164.2 Hicrophones, speakers & audio asp 2297 1758 4204 45.2 133.2 500.4
764.4 Elect telp It telegraph eq 1 pts 1156 6486 21586 153.3 287.2 1096.4
764.4 Integrated Circuits 88333 82203 132704 442.3 280.4 929.5
764.9 Parts nspf of telecom & sound repr 6426 5932 12109 313.1 491.6 1734.5
771.2 Non rotating elect power equip 6840 4999 9815 19.2 125.3 237.7
773.1 Insulated electric conducts (cable) 1312 2263 5359 32.6 304.6 177.3
775.7 Etect-.ech household appliances nsp 2252 1296 3888 38.9 117.1 71,6
775.8 Electro-thersic appliances nspf & p 2759 2803 2654 300.1 94.97 S9t6
778.8 Ferrltes nspf; elect .ach & equ nsp 10312 3785 5734 96.5 236.1 750
781.0 Passenger motor veh (except publ. s 2410 2529 3321 708.7 2.8 2.2
785.2 Adult cycles 1151 1463 4057 13.7 199.5 68.4
788.0 Parts nspf of motor web I handling 619 1113 2486 56.3 204.7 2972.3
812.4 LightIng fixtures & fittings 612 1373 3863 19 288.6 20.1
821.8 Furniture I parts thereof nspf 1208 795 3184 53.5 968 177.4
631.0 Luggage, handbags 2926 1763 4311 331.1 522.8 33.6
842.3 Slacks etc, cot, wool, mel 6158 4511 12532 65.6 157.8 16.2
843.7 Car, for ralnwr; ot wear nspf 10331 6347 8511 328.4 401.1 174.1
644.1 Shirts, cot, wool, cf NI knit .18 4860 5752 14582 270.3 199.7 2.6
045.5 Sweaters & 0 wear app textile KI 5587 6029 8203 687.4 165.4 40
846.8 U garments, inc shirts of tex nspf 4533 4163 9146 237.9 336.6 28.7
888.1 Clowes, bits & ot wear app In, isp 9914 6140 11115 347.3 141.6 99
848.3 Fur clothing & ot art cx headvear 38801 10474 33778 120.4 5.6 0.3
651.0 Footwear, new, etc military or orth 3724 3113 4304 1489 2101.1 13.1
819.2 Jewelry etc, costume & se.I—preciou 7530 5911 32948 19.4 106.6 63.5
081.1 Still cameras & parts; flash appara 21438 12308 47152 17.5 105.1 792.4
684.2 Eyeglasses, eyeglass frames & parts 10823 6250 39687 31.4 114 06
801.0 Articles of rubber or plastics nspf 940 913 3148 100 699 314.9
89&2 toys, ga.es christ.as ornaunts,etc 2705 1780 3789 519.5 181.1 34L2
894.7 Sporting goods etc nspf 2246 1228 4004 163 538.8 143.3
898.3 Sound etc recordings & blank media 3430 3603 5669 173.6 35.7 96!.!
